When you inject capital into the parent, it may or may not benefit the subsidiary.
— Charles Dallara
If you step back and think about it, just a little over two years ago, in 2009, it was not surprising at all to see Chinese exports growing at a 30-plus percent clip.
You look at the U.S. budget deficit, and you cannot help but feel that this is a serious accident waiting to happen. And not just a serious U.S. accident, but a serious global accident.
Some of the policy measures that are important are politically difficult if taken independent of actions by others in support of common goals. Joint actions are therefore needed, and establishing a G-11 with an effective role for the IMF provides the viable way forward.
We can no longer contemplate a world in which public or private sector funds are used to bail out or recapitalize failing firms.
How can the United States preserve its financial and security leadership role when it conducts itself with such ineptitude and such disregard for the consequences for the world?
Unfortunately, I think we could see that fairly early in 2015: The cloud of economic weakness in Russia is spreading over Europe. It has the potential of spreading into contagion into other emerging markets, particularly those with large energy companies, such as Petrobras in Brazil.
Observers and even some officials raise questions about the future of Greece as part of the Eurozone, while the Eurozone itself struggles to deal with fundamental flaws at the heart of its architecture.
It is certainly possible that the Greek economy can revive and achieve some growth over the years ahead.
It was very important for us to hear that both European governments and the IMF are going to sustain and augment their commitment to Greece because they don't pursue the debt reduction route. They're actually extending more debt, more loans to Greece.
It is time to recognise that austerity alone condemns not just Greece but the whole of Europe to the probability of a painful and protracted era of little or no economic growth. This would be a tragedy not just for Greece and for Europe, but for the world.
We remain open to explore options on a voluntary approach built on a realistic outlook for the Greek economy and restoration of Greece's market access.
The risk of policy contagion could be magnified if a new funding arrangement were agreed between Argentina and the IMF before a comprehensive policy framework is developed that addresses fundamental investor concerns.
2005 is highly likely to be a more challenging environment, both for policymakers and investors.
A new forum is needed that reflects the realities of today's globalised world and the rising importance of emerging markets.
A core group of the world's leading economies need to come together and hammer out an understanding.
The Germans argue - and I can fully understand them - that the euro countries must surrender their sovereignty, because that is the only way to implement budget discipline in a fiscal union.
The Greek people deserve an economy that is not burdened forever by a heavy bureaucracy and a bloated public sector.
If the official community is interested in asking the private sector to take another look at Greece, then it will have to be only as part of a broader process of addressing the full range of sovereign debt issues in Europe.
Greece's debt is going to be a function of a lot of factors down the road.
I think it is incumbent on the rest of us - and I would suggest that includes other European leaders - to pause in what has become a very popular game of telling the Greeks how to run their lives.
Our long-term prosperity depends critically on the ability of world leaders to make politically difficult decisions at a time when the global economy is still vulnerable on so many fronts.
In a moment of stress, funding may go to systemically-important firms, which could pull funding away from firms not making the cut.
Countries that are occasionally immature in their ability to manage their economic affairs as well as they should - and that includes most of them - are going to find that the world is at risk.
The emphasis so far on fiscal austerity, while to a degree necessary for the countries facing market funding difficulties, is excessive when carried out across the board.
We have not argued in either Brazil or Argentina that the IMF should step in to protect the banks.
Exchange rate understandings are of little use on their own.
The Fed cannot levitate markets forever. And when they finally do move, I think we have to be prepared for a considerable amount of turbulence.
I had the privilege of living in Greece in the early 1970s.
I think that it would be a mistake for any institution to think that their stake in a default or in a voluntary accord is determined by the amount of their exposure, hedged or unhedged.
I think Putin will have to find a way to signal, even if it's a modest signal, an openness to dialogue.
Greece's unprecedented fiscal effort, which was more than planned, has triggered much larger contractions of economic activity and the tax base than the original program had assumed.
Threats of trade protectionism, plus unilateral actions on the exchange-rate front, such as the heavy interventions of China, Japan, and Switzerland in the currency markets - not to mention the retaliatory tariffs recently passed by the U.S. House of Representatives - endanger growth prospects and could further depress financial market confidence.
