I don't approve of the notion that we should be announcing who should step down from the position of a head of a state unless we are seriously prepared to remove that person. But if we are not, if we are being prudent and careful, then let's also be careful with how we talk.
— Zbigniew Brzezinski
You go to Paris, or you go to Portugal, you go to Poland, and you ask, 'Who are you people?' They'll tell you, we're Portuguese, we're Spanish, we're Polish. Who are the people that are really European? The people in Brussels, in the E.U. bureaucracy. Europe has not been able to move to the level of patriotic identification with the concept.
The difference between the Bush I war against Iraq and the Bush II war against Iraq is that in the first one, we appealed to the sentiments and interests of the different groupings in the region and had them with us. In the second one, we did it on our own, on the basis of false premises, with extremely brutality and lack of political skill.
Moderation and bipartisan consensus go hand in hand.
You know who's messianic? Netanyahu, because he talks that way. And that's a very risky position.
We can't have an intelligent foreign policy unless we have an intelligent public, because we're a democracy.
The fact of the matter is the Arab elites are more inclined to accommodate our wishes because of certain overlapping interests that are often financial. That is not the case with the Arab masses.
A Russia that gradually begins to gravitate toward the West will also be a Russia that ceases to disrupt the international system.
The Soviet Union's termination, which brought to an end the bipolar world, ushered in an era of U.S. hegemony. Hegemony, however, should not be confused with omnipotence. Hegemony is not omnipotence but is certainly preponderance.
Neither the United States nor Israel has the capacity to impose a unilateral solution in the Middle East.
What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
If we slide into a pattern of just thinking about today, we'll end up reacting to yesterday instead of shaping something more constructive in the world.
Foreign policy should not be justified through making oneself feel good, but through results that have tangible consequences.
Yes, ISIS is a threat. It's more than a nuisance. It's also in many respects criminal violence. But it isn't, in my view, a central strategic issue facing humanity.
There's no point considering something which is very unrealistic.
The war of choice in Iraq could never have gained the congressional support it got without the psychological linkage between the shock of 9/11 and the postulated existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The 'war on terror' has created a culture of fear in America.
Saddam Hussein was an odious dictator, but he was also a very effective opponent of Iran. He was also a very effective opponent of al-Qaida.
The problem with the Iranian regime, of course is, one, its unsettling effects on the Sunnis, particularly Saudi Arabia, and, secondly, its potential threat to Israel.
AIPAC has consistently opposed a two-state solution, and a lot of members of Congress have been intimidated, and I don't think that's healthy.
The security link between us and Europe is very important for European security but also for our security.
We defended our allies in Europe for 40 years during the worst days of the Cold War - very threatening days of the Cold War - and nothing happened. So deterrence does work.
I would like to promote internal change in Iran - which is more likely if we don't fuse Iranian nationalism with Iranian fundamentalism.
I think we have to pay attention to the Arab masses not just in the Gulf States, but also in the hinterlands.
I do think America has made it quite clear that it is in the interest both of America and China to avoid situations in which they will be pushed toward a collision.
The mullahs are part of the past in Iran, not its future. But change in Iran will come through engagement, not through confrontation.
If we end up with war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran at the same time, can anyone see a more damaging prospect for America's world role than that?
The Chinese are really good at diplomacy - and even at making their interlocutors feel very uncomfortable.
I'm all in favour of grand important speeches, but the president then has to link his sermons to a strategy.
We all have the right to comment about each other.
Hard power makes sense under some circumstances. But there's not a universal solution to global problems.
I have been struck by the pervasive frequency of pompously patriotic ads for the defense industry, usually accompanied by deferential salutations to our men and women who are heroically sacrificing their lives in our defense. Do we really need all of that for our security?
Constant reference to a 'war on terror' did accomplish one major objective: It stimulated the emergence of a culture of fear.
According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979.
Rushing to war is not a wise course of action.
Basically, I see Iran as an authentic nation-state. And that authentic identity gives it cohesion, which most of the Middle East lacks.
Terrorism cannot be isolated from its political, historical, and even social context.
If we can deter the Soviet Union, if we can deter North Korea, why on earth can't we deter Iran?
We don't have a public that really understands the world anymore, and in the age of complexity, that problem becomes much more difficult.
Look: I don't want to live with a nuclear Iran. I would like to make it uncomfortable for them to seek it.
I draw a very clear distinction between populism and democracy.
The Sino-American competition involves two significant realities that distinguish it from the Cold War: neither party is excessively ideological in its orientation; and both parties recognize that they really need mutual accommodation.
Sometimes in international politics, the better part of wisdom is to defer dangers rather than try to eliminate them altogether instantly.
I realise that in an electoral campaign, you don't want to antagonise large groups which are highly motivated.
Americans don't learn about the world; they don't study world history, other than American history in a very one-sided fashion, and they don't study geography.
There may be circumstances in which damaging our relationship with countries over human rights is counterproductive and the benefits to human rights may be very small because of our limited capacity to enforce our stance. That was the dilemma the United States faced after Tiananmen Square.
I don't feel I was 'born American,' but my homeland was denied to me after the end of World War II, and I craved something I could identify with. When I became a student at Harvard in the 1950s, America very quickly filled the vacuum. I felt I was American, but I think it's more revealing of America how quickly others here accepted me.
The legitimacy of the leadership depends on what that country thinks of its leaders.
There's something troubling about a condition in which one country alone, which has roughly 5 percent of the world's population, spends more than 50 percent of the world's defense budgets. There's something weird about it.
Fear obscures reason, intensifies emotions, and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue.
